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What’s New: v 1.8.0f
CUSTOM LOBBIES
• By popular demand, you can now create your own game room, invite your friends and enjoy the action
2 NEW ARMOR SETS
• Ronin and Renegade: Amazing in both looks and perks
NEW MULTIPLAYER MAP
• Conversion: A well-balanced map with a variety of tactical opportunities
IMPROVED LEAGUE SYSTEM
• Raise your rank to reap higher rewards and get blueprints for the highest tier of weapons
REFERRAL SYSTEM
• Invite friends to join the game and you’ll both be handsomely rewarded

What’s In The MOD:
GOD MODE

Requires Android: 4.0 and Up

Version: 1.8.0f

MODE: ONLINE

PLAY LINK: MODERN COMBAT 5 BLACKOUT

Download Links:
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MC5 MOD APK

USERSCLOUD:
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DAILYUPLOADS:
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UPLODIT:
MC5 MOD APK

ZIPPYSHARE:
MC5 MOD APK

DATAFILEHOST:
MC5 MOD APK

Install APK,Download data directly from game and play.

It is rather clear, and with provided code we can assume that up to 4 patchguard contexts can
be active on a running system simultaneously. Remember this one because wherever it is
called, we can be 100% sure that a new patchguard context is being initialized.

The function that creates and initializes patchguard context is so-called
"KiInitializePatchGuardContext". It is a huge obfuscated function. I guess it is suitable to
reference Alexs Ionescu tweet about it:

"I love the new #Windows 8 Patch Guard. Fixes so many of the obvious holes in downlevel, and the new hyper-inlined obfuscation makes me cry."

You bet it! IDA Pros decompiler works on it ~20 min on 3770 Core i7 CPU and spews out 26K
lines of code. It is not worth dealing with it as a single unit. Luckily, you can bite out small
pieces of information that give you a clue about methods that the new patchguard uses. Thats
why we did not reverse engineer it entirely, as instead we took and analyzed several parts in it.
Feel free to explore this function yourself, and you may discover new wonderful things!

It takes 5 parameters on Windows 8.1:

1. Index of DPC routine to be called from a created patchguard DPC for checking the
patchguard context. It may be one of these:

Also those 10 DPCs are regular system DPCs with useful payload, but when they encounter a
DeferredContext which has non-canonical address, they fire a corresponding
KiCustomAccessRoutine function.

These functions are only called when an appropriate scheduling method is used (0, 1, 2, 5)

2. Scheduling method:

These are the methods that are used to fire a patchguard DPC object that is created inside
"KiInitializePatchGuardContext" function.

• KeSetCoalescableTimer (0). A timer object is created with a random fire period between 2 minutes and 2 minutes and 10 seconds.
• Prcb.AcpiReserved (1). In this case a patchguard DPC is fired when a certain ACPI event occurs, f.e. transitioning to idle state. In this case "HalpTimerDPCRoutine" checks if 2 minutes have passed since last queued by itself DPC, and queues another one, taken from Prcb.AcpiReserved field.
• Prcb.HalReserved (2). Here a patchguard DPC is queued when HAL timer clock interrupt occurs, in the "HalpMcaQueueDpc". It is also done with 2 minutes period at least. Queued patchguard DPC is taken from Prcb.HalReserved field.
• PsCreateSystemThread (3). In this case, patchguard DPC routine is not used, as instead a system thread is created. The thread procedure is taken from KI_FILTER_FIBER_PARAM structure. Patchguard DPC in turn is used just as a container of the address of a newly created patchguard context.
• KeInsertQueueApc (4). This time a regular kernel APC is queued to the one of the system threads with "KiDispatchCallout" APC procedure. No patchguard DPC is fired also. System thread is chosen based on its start address, i.e. it must be equal to either PopIrpWorkerControl or CcQueueLazyWriteScanThread.
• KiBalanceSetManagerPeriodicDpc (5). Patchguard DPC is stored in a global variable named "KiBalanceSetManagerPeriodicDpc". It is queued in "KiUpdateTimeAssist" function and "KeClockInterruptNotify" function within every "KiBalanceSetManagerPeriod" ticks.

3. This parameter can be either 1 or 2. We are not sure about how it affects "KiInitializePatchGuardContext" function, but it is somehow connected to the quantity of checks
being done during patchguard context verification routine execution.

4. A pointer to KI_FILTER_FIBER_PARAM structure. It is noticeable that a method chosen inside
"KiInitializePatchGuardContext" is selected based on the presence of this parameter. If it is
present, a method bit mask is tested with 0x29 (101001b) which allows methods 0, 3 and 5.
Otherwise methods 0, 1, 2 and 4 are available. That makes sense, because methods 3 and 5
require a valid KI_FILTER_FIBER_PARAM structure.

5. Boolean parameter which tells if NT kernel functions checksums have to be recalculated.
As you might guess, the only scheduling method that can be initialized twice is 0, so
"KiFilterFiberContext" takes this fact into account when chooses a method for a second call of
"KiInitializePatchGuardContext".


Firing a patchguard check

Methods that fire patchguard DPC

The main principle of patchguard check routine is to launch a patchguard context verification
routine on a DPC level, and then queue a work item that will check vital system structures on a
passive level with a proceeding context recreation and rescheduling. The verification work item
uses a copy of "FsRtlUninitializeSmallMcb" function. You can check this one out, if you want to
figure out how the check works.

For the methods which use DPC activation there is a common code inside 10 listed DPC
routines, which checks "DeferredContext" for being a non-canonical address. If it is OK, DPC
just executes its payload. Otherwise one of 10 "KiCustomAccessRoutineX" functions is called.

When "KiCustomAccessRoutineX" is called, (last 2 bits + 1) of "DeferredContext" are taken and
used to roll along "KiCustomRecurseRoutineX". These recursive routines are cycled
incrementing X value. When the roll is over, "KiCustomRecurseRoutineX" tries to dereference a
DeferredContext value as a pointer, which inevitably generates #GP exception since this
address is non-canonical.


// Inside DPC routine
if ( (DeferredContext >> 47) < 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFui64 && DeferredContext >> 47 != 0 )
// Is DeferredContext a canonical address
{
      ...
      KiCustomAccessRoutineX(DeferredContext);
      ...
}

void KiCustomAccessRoutine9(DWORD64 DeferredContext)
{
      return KiCustomRecurseRoutine9((DeferredContext & 3) + 1, DeferredContext);
}

void KiCustomRecurseRoutine9(DWORD dwRoll, DWORD64 DeferredContext)
{

      DWORD dwNextRoll;
      DWORD64 go_go_GP;

      dwNextRoll = dwRoll - 1;

      if ( dwNextRoll )
             KiCustomRecurseRoutine0(dwNextRoll, DeferredContext);

      go_go_GP = *DeferredContext; // #GP
}


// DPC routine call sequence
ExpTimerDpcRoutine ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine0 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine0 ...
KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

IopTimerDispatch ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine1 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine1 ...
KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

IopIrpStackProfilerTimer -> KiCustomAccessRoutine2 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine2 ...
KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

PopThermalZoneDpc ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine3 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine3 ... KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

CmpEnableLazyFlushDpcRoutine ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine4 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine4 ... KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

CmpLazyFlushDpcRoutine ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine5 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine5 ... KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

KiBalanceSetManagerDeferredRoutine ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine6 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine6 ... KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

ExpTimeRefreshDpcRoutine ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine7 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine7 ... KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

ExpTimeZoneDpcRoutine ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine8 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine8 ... KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

ExpCenturyDpcRoutine ->  KiCustomAccessRoutine9 ->  KiCustomRecurseRoutine9 ... KiCustomRecurseRoutineN

Here comes vectored exception handling again. If you look up all the exception handlers for
these DPC routines, youll discover that there are several nested __try__except and
__try__finally blocks. For example, "ExpTimerDpcRoutine" looks something like this:

...
__try
{
     __try
    {
          __try
         {
              __try
             {
                   KiCustomAccessRoutine0(DeferredContext);
             }
             __finally
             {
                   FinalSub1();
             }
         }
         __except (FilterSub1()) // patchguard context decryption occurs here
        {
               // Nothing
        }
    }
    __finally
    {
         FinalSub2();
    }
}
__except (FilterSub2())
{
      // Nothing
}
...

ExpCenturyDpcRoutine, ExpTimeZoneDpcRoutine, ExpTimeRefreshDpcRoutine,
KiBalanceSetManagerDeferredRoutine, CmpLazyFlushDpcRoutine, CmpEnableLazyFlushDpcRoutine,
PopThermalZoneDpc, ExpTimerDpcRoutine … ->  _C_specific_handler

IopIrpStackProfilerTimer , IopTimerDispatch … ->  _GSHandlerCheck_SEH (GS check + _C_specific_handler)

Depending on the DPC routine, decryption routine (based on KiWaitAlways and KiWaitNever
variables) may reside in one of the exception filters, exception handlers or termination handlers.
Further patchguard context verification occurs also inside decryption routine, right after the
decryption.

As for "KiTimerDispatch" and "KiDpcDispatch" DPC routines - they call patchguard context
verification directly. Also, depending on the DPC routine a different type of patchguard context
encryption is used (or not used at all).

Other methods

Method 3 creates a system thread. System thread procedure sleeps between 2 minutes and 2
minutes and 10 seconds using "KeDelayExecutionThread" or "KeWaitForSingleObject" on a
kernel object, which is always not signaled. After the wait is timed out it decrypts patchguard
context and executes verification routine.

Method 4 inserts an APC with "KiDispatchCallout" function as a kernel routine and
"EmpCheckErrataList" as a normal routine. Patchguard context decryption and validation occurs

upon APC delivery to the target waiting thread, which happens almost immediately. A 2 minutes
wait is located inside the verifier work item routine i

Available link for download